The biohazard of coupling PGP with OLSR

the (sad story of the) web of trust plug-in and its defects





clauz and ZioPRoTo ninux.org



OLSR

0		31			
Packet Length		Packet Sequence Number			
Message Type	Vtime	Message Size			
	Originator Address				
Time To Live	Hop Count	Message Sequence Number			
	MESS	SAGE			
Message Type	Vtime	Message Size			
	Originato	r Address			
Time To Live	Hop Count	Message Sequence Number			
MESSAGE					
:					









PGP



- Mixed Asymmetric/Symmetric cryptography for encryption and signing
- Decentralized web of trust
- Used prevalently for e-mails
- Social:
 - Zimmerman's motivations for writing PGP
 - Key signing parties

Biohazard

- PGP-sign packets hop by hop
 - Assumption: I trust what my trusted neighbors trust
- Use the trust associated with PGP signatures to build multiple routing tables, each with a different level of trust
- Then use these routing tables to implement trusted routes




Secure OLSR plug-in

0		31			
Message Type	Vtime	e Message Size			
Originator Address					
Time To Live	Hop Count	Message Sequence Number			
Scheme	Algorithms	Reserved			
Timestamp					
Signature (160 bits)					

- By Tønnesen (et al.)
- Nodes share a common secret
- OLSR message to sign OLSR packets



Secure OLSR plug-in - timestamp exchange



0 31				
Message Type	Vtime Message Size			
Originator Address				
Time To Live Hop Count Message Sequence Number				
Destination				
Random value "challenge"				
Signature (160 bits)				

0 31					
Message Type	Vtime	time Message Size			
Originator Address					
Time To Live Hop Count Message Sequence Number					
Destination					
Random value "challenge"					
Timestamp					
Response Signature (160 bits)					
Signature (160 bits)					

0 31				
Message Type	Vtime Message Size			
Originator Address				
Time To Live Hop Count Message Sequence Number				
Destination				
Timestamp				
Response Signature (160 bits)				
Signature (160 bits)				



OLSR web of trust plug-in

0		31			
Packet L	ength	Packet Sequence Number			
Message Type	Vtime	Message Size			
Originator Address					
Time To Live	Hop Count	Message Sequence Number			
MESSAGE					
Message Type	Vtime	Message Size			
	Originato	r Address			
Time To Live	Hop Count	Message Sequence Number			
MESSAGE :					
Message Type	Vtime	Message Size			
Originator Address					
Time To Live	Hop Count	Message Sequence Number			
Scheme	Algorithms	Reserved			
Timestamp					
Signature (variable size)					

- Basically, keep the same structure of the secure plug-in, but:
 - Use PGP (GnuPG) signatures (that have a variable size)
 - Use trust to add entries to different routing tables



OLSR web of trust plug-in

0		31			
Message Type	age Type Vtime Message Size				
	Originator Address				
Time To Live Hop Count Message Sequence Number					
Destination					
Random value "challenge"					
Timestamp					
Response Hash (160 bits)					
Signature Size					
Signature (variable size) + Padding					
 					



Trust-based routing

- When an entry has to be inserted in the routing table, this entry is added to the appropriate routing table, on a trust value basis
- Then add tc filter policy routing rules based on the user traffic's IP ToS field







Load on the CPU

 Asymmetric cryptography is too heavy (more than 1000 times slower)

	Symmetric	RSA	DSA	measure unit
Length of the key	128	1024	1024	bits
Basic signature verification	0.132	159.422	150.784	milliseconds
Basic signature adding	0.05	55.477	60.130	milliseconds

 To use the plug-in, {Hello,TC,MID,HNA}Interval and {Hello,TC,MID,HNA}ValidityTime have to be increased




Load on the CPU

- PGP keys can be used to exchange symmetric session keys between neighboring nodes
 - This can be done during the timestamp exchange



Routing loops

 PGP trust is **not** a good metric (if decisions are made hop by hop)



• Solution: use a symmetric metric, e.g. Eigentrust




False Multipath routing

- When an entry has to be inserted in the routing table, this entry is added to the appropriate routing table, on a trust value basis, checking the "trust status"
 - This is like "tagging" routes
 - Which is the orthodox way of doing this?
 - Keep different OLSR topology databases?
 - Modify dijkstra with weights?



Some routes are missing

It is not true that all nodes know all the topology



References

- http://hg.ninux.org/olsrd-ninux-messy/rawattachment/wiki/WikiStart/Tesi_di_Claudio_Pisa_ rc6_Trusted_Routing_In_OLSR_MANETs.pdf
- http://hg.ninux.org/olsrd-ninux-messy/rawattachment/wiki/WikiStart/olsrd_weboftrust_plu gin-0.1.tar.gz

